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# Summary of Social Proxy Voting Guidelines

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## General Approach to Corporate Governance and Proxy Voting

When voting (or refraining from voting) proxies, Dimensional<sup>1</sup> seeks to act in the best interests of the funds and accounts Dimensional manages and consistent with applicable legal and fiduciary standards. Dimensional seeks to maximize shareholder value subject to the standards of legal and regulatory regimes (applicable to the Advisor or the client), listing requirements, corporate governance and stewardship codes, and the investment or voting guidelines of the fund or account.<sup>2</sup>

Dimensional expects the members of a portfolio company's board to act in the interests of the company's shareholders. Each portfolio company's board should implement policies and adopt practices that align the interests of the board and management with those of its shareholders. Since a board's main responsibility is to oversee management and to manage and mitigate risk, it is important that board members have the experience and skills to carry out that responsibility.

This summary outlines Dimensional's global approach to key proxy voting issues and highlights particular considerations in specific markets for the funds and accounts that incorporate sustainability considerations in their investment guidelines or have made an affirmative election or provided instruction that Dimensional should prioritize such considerations as part of voting (the "Social-Voting Funds and Accounts").

1. "Dimensional" refers to any of Dimensional Fund Advisors LP, Dimensional Fund Advisors Ltd., DFA Australia Limited, Dimensional Fund Advisors Pte. Ltd., Dimensional Ireland Limited, or Dimensional Japan Ltd.

2. For considerations in connection with ERISA-covered clients, see Dimensional's Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures and its references to requirements under ERISA.

## GLOBAL EVALUATION FRAMEWORK – SOCIAL

Dimensional's Global Evaluation Framework – Social sets out Dimensional's general expectations for all portfolio companies in Social-Voting Funds and Accounts. When implementing the principles contained in Dimensional's Global Evaluation Framework in a given market, in addition to the relevant legal and regulatory requirements, Dimensional will consider local market practices. Additionally, for portfolio companies in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Japan, and Australia, Dimensional will apply the market-specific considerations contained in the relevant subsection in these Guidelines.

### Uncontested Director Elections

Dimensional may vote against individual directors, committee members, or the full board of a portfolio company, such as in the following situations:

1. There are problematic audit-related practices;
2. There are problematic compensation practices or persistent pay-for performance misalignment;
3. There are problematic antitakeover provisions;
4. There have been material failures of governance, risk oversight, or fiduciary responsibilities;
5. The board has failed to adequately respond to shareholder concerns;
6. The board has demonstrated a lack of accountability to shareholders;
7. There is an ineffective board refreshment process.<sup>3</sup>

If a director is a member of multiple boards of various portfolio companies and one of those boards has one of the issues listed in 1–7 above, Dimensional may vote against that director with respect to the board of the portfolio company with the issue as well as any other portfolio company boards.

Dimensional also considers the following when voting on directors of portfolio companies:

1. Board and committee independence;
2. Director attendance: Dimensional generally expects directors to attend at least 75% of board and committee meetings;
3. Director capacity to serve;
4. Board composition.

3. As used in these guidelines, "board refreshment process" means the method for reviewing and establishing the composition of the board of the portfolio company (e.g., assessments or self-evaluation, succession planning, approach for searches for board members, criteria for qualification of board members).

### Board Refreshment

An effective board refreshment process for a portfolio company can include the alignment of directors' skills with business needs, assessment of individual director performance and feedback, and a search process for new directors that appropriately incorporates qualification criteria. Dimensional believes information about a portfolio company's assessment and refreshment process should be disclosed and should generally include:

- The processes and procedures by which the company identifies the key competencies that directors should possess in order to ensure the board is able to appropriately oversee the risks and opportunities associated with the company's strategy and operations;
- How the performance of individual directors and the board as a whole is assessed;
- The alignment between the skills and expertise of each board member and the key competencies identified in the board assessment process;
- Board refreshment mechanisms;
- Director recruitment policies and procedures; and
- The extent to which diversity considerations are incorporated into board assessment and refreshment practices and director recruitment policies.

In evaluating a portfolio company's refreshment process, Dimensional may consider, among other information:

- Whether the portfolio company's board assessment process meets market best practices in terms of objectiveness, rigor, disclosure, and other criteria;
- Whether the portfolio company complies with market best practice with regards to refreshment mechanisms, including tenure limits; and
- Whether the portfolio company has board entrenchment devices, such as a classified board or plurality vote standard.

Dimensional may consider a board's diversity when evaluating the effectiveness of a portfolio company's board refreshment process. Dimensional may consider whether a portfolio company seeks to follow market best practices as the portfolio company nominates new directors and assesses the performance of existing directors who have the diversity of backgrounds, experiences, and skill sets needed to effectively oversee management and manage risk.

If Dimensional believes that a portfolio company's board assessment and refreshment process is not sufficiently rigorous, or if the portfolio company fails to disclose adequate information for Dimensional to assess the rigor of the process, Dimensional may vote against members of the Nominating Committee or other relevant directors.

### Bundled/Slate Director Elections

Dimensional generally opposes bundled director elections at portfolio companies; however, in markets where individual director elections are not an established practice, bundled elections are acceptable as long as the full list of candidates is disclosed in a timely manner.

### Contested Director Elections

In the case of contested board elections at portfolio companies, Dimensional takes a case-by-case approach. With the goal of maximizing shareholder value, Dimensional considers the qualifications of the nominees, the likelihood that each side can accomplish their stated plans, the portfolio company's corporate governance practices, and the incumbent board's history of responsiveness to shareholders.

### Board Size

Dimensional believes that portfolio company boards are responsible for determining an appropriate size of the board of directors within the confines of relevant corporate governance codes and best practice standards. However, Dimensional will generally oppose proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the portfolio company or the board.

### Auditors

Dimensional will typically support the ratification of auditors unless there are concerns with the auditor's independence, the accuracy of the auditor's report, the level of non-audit fees, or if lack of disclosure makes it difficult for us to assess these factors.

In addition to voting against the ratification of the auditors, Dimensional may also vote against or withhold votes from audit committee members at portfolio companies in instances of fraud, material weakness, or significant financial restatements.

### Antitakeover Provisions

Dimensional believes that the market for corporate control, which often results in acquisitions that increase shareholder value, should be able to function without undue restrictions. Takeover defenses such as shareholder rights plans (poison pills) can lead to entrenchment of management and reduced accountability at the board level. Dimensional will generally vote against the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Dimensional may vote against directors at portfolio companies that adopt or maintain antitakeover provisions without shareholder approval post-initial public offering ("IPO") or adopted such structures prior to, or in connection with, an IPO. Dimensional may vote against such directors not just at the portfolio company that adopted the antitakeover provision, but at all other portfolio company boards they serve on.

### Related-Party Transactions

Related-party transactions have played a significant role in several high-profile corporate scandals and failures. Dimensional believes related-party transactions should be minimized. When such transactions are determined to be fair to the portfolio company and its shareholders in accordance with the portfolio company's policies and governing law, they should be thoroughly disclosed in public filings.

### Amendments to Articles of Association/Incorporation

Dimensional expects the details of proposed amendments to articles of association or incorporation, or similar portfolio company documents, to be clearly disclosed. Dimensional will typically support such amendments that are routine in nature or are required or prompted by regulatory changes. Dimensional may vote against amendments that negatively impact shareholder rights or diminish board oversight.

### Equity-Based Remuneration

Dimensional supports the adoption of equity plans that align the interests of the portfolio company board, management, and portfolio company employees with those of shareholders.

Dimensional will evaluate equity plans on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the potential dilution to shareholders, the portfolio company's historical use of equity, and the particular plan features.

### Executive Remuneration

Dimensional supports remuneration for executives that is clearly linked to the portfolio company's performance. Remuneration should be designed to attract, retain and appropriately motivate and serve as a means to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders.

Dimensional expects portfolio companies to structure executive compensation in a manner that does not insulate management from the consequences of failures of risk oversight and management. Dimensional typically supports clawback provisions in executive compensation plans as a way to mitigate risk of excessive risk taking by executives at portfolio companies.

Dimensional supports remuneration plan metrics that are quantifiable and clearly tied to company strategy and the creation of shareholder value. The use of standard financial metrics, for example, metrics based on generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") or international financial reporting standards, when determining executive pay is generally considered by Dimensional to be preferable. The use of non-standard metrics, including those involving large non-GAAP adjustments, result in less transparency for investors and may lead to artificially high executive pay. In evaluating a portfolio company's executive compensation, Dimensional considers whether the portfolio company is disclosing what each metric is intended to capture, how performance is measured, what targets have been set, and performance against those targets.

While environmental and social (E&S) issues may be material for shareholder value, Dimensional believes linking E&S metrics to executive pay in a quantifiable and transparent manner can present particular challenges. Dimensional will seek to focus on the rigor of E&S metrics and will seek to scrutinize payouts made under these metrics, particularly when there has been under performance against other metrics tied to financial performance or shareholder value.

To the extent that remuneration is clearly excessive and not aligned with the portfolio company's performance or other factors, Dimensional would not support such remuneration. Additionally, Dimensional expects portfolio companies to strive to follow local market practices with regards to the specific elements of remuneration and the overall structure of the remuneration plan.

Therefore, Dimensional reviews proposals seeking approval of a portfolio company's executive remuneration plan closely, taking into account the quantum of pay, portfolio company performance, and the structure of the plan.

In markets where components of executive remuneration, such as performance rights or options, are required to be subject to a separate shareholder vote, Dimensional will consider these proposals in line with the principles above.

### Director Remuneration

Dimensional will generally support director remuneration at portfolio companies that is reasonable in both size and composition relative to industry and market norms.

### Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)

Dimensional's primary consideration in evaluating mergers and acquisitions is maximizing shareholder value. Given that Dimensional believes market prices reflect future expected cash flows, an important consideration is the price reaction to the announcement, and the extent to which the deal represents a premium to the preannouncement price. Dimensional will also consider the strategic rationale, potential conflicts of interest, and the possibility of competing offers.

Dimensional may vote against deals where there are concerns with the acquisition process or where there appear to be significant conflicts of interest.

### Capitalization

Dimensional will vote case by case on proposals related to portfolio company share issuances, taking into account the purpose for which the shares will be used, the risk to shareholders of not approving the request, and the dilution to existing shareholders.

### Unequal Voting Rights

Dimensional opposes the creation of share structures that provide for unequal voting rights, including dual-class stock with unequal voting rights or mechanisms such as loyalty shares that may skew economic ownership and voting rights within the same class of shares, and will generally vote against proposals to create or continue such structures. On a case-by-case basis, Dimensional may also vote against directors at portfolio companies that adopt or maintain such structures without shareholder approval post-IPO or adopted such structures prior to, or in connection with, an IPO.

### Say on Climate

Dimensional will generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to introduce Say on Climate votes, which propose that companies' climate-risk management plans are put to a recurring advisory shareholder vote. Dimensional believes that strategic planning, including mitigation of climate-related risks and oversight of opportunities presented by potential climate change, is the responsibility of the portfolio company board and should not be delegated or transferred to shareholders. If a portfolio company's climate-risk management plan is put to a shareholder vote, then Dimensional will generally vote against the plan, regardless of the level of detail contained in the plan, to indicate our opposition to the delegation of oversight implied by such votes. If Dimensional observes that a portfolio company board is failing to adequately guard shareholder value through strategic planning, Dimensional may vote against directors.

### Shareholder Proposals

Dimensional's goal when voting on portfolio company shareholder proposals is to support those proposals that protect or enhance shareholder value through improved board accountability, improved policies and procedures, or improved disclosure.

When evaluating environmental or social shareholder proposals, Dimensional will use research to consider whether the proposal addresses a material issue to the portfolio company, the portfolio company's current handling of the issue (both on an absolute basis and relative to market practices), the portfolio company's compliance with regulatory requirements, and the potential cost to the portfolio company of implementing the proposal.

On behalf of Social-Voting Funds or Accounts, Dimensional will typically support, subject to the foregoing considerations, proposals for greater board accountability, improved policies and procedures, or increased disclosure on the following matters:

- Climate-related risks and greenhouse gas emissions
- Environmental impact
- Climate-related lobbying activities
- Financing of fossil fuel activities
- Workforce gender diversity
- Human rights risk
- Factory farming
- Sale and distribution of tobacco products

In addition, and subject to the foregoing, Dimensional will typically not support on behalf of Social-Voting Funds or Accounts proposals favoring access to abortion.

### Virtual Meetings

Dimensional does not oppose the use of virtual-only meetings if shareholders are provided with the same rights and opportunities as available during a physical meeting, including:

- The ability to see and hear portfolio company representatives;
- The ability to ask questions of portfolio company representatives; and
- The ability to see or hear questions submitted to portfolio company representatives by other shareholders, including those questions not answered by portfolio company representatives.

### Disclosure of Vote Results

Dimensional expects detailed disclosure of voting results. In cases where vote results have not been disclosed within a reasonable time frame, Dimensional may vote against individual directors, committee members, or the full board of a portfolio company.



## VOTING GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MATTERS

Dimensional believes that portfolio company boards are responsible for addressing material environmental and social risks within their duties. If a portfolio company is unresponsive to environmental or social risks that may have material economic ramifications for shareholders, Dimensional may vote against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, or may vote in favor of related shareholder proposals consistent with Dimensional's general approach to such E&S proposals. Dimensional may communicate with portfolio companies to better understand the alignment of the interests of boards and management with those of shareholders on these topics.

Dimensional evaluates shareholder proposals on environmental or social issues by paying particular attention to the portfolio company's current handling of the issue, current disclosures, the financial materiality of the issue, market practices, and regulatory requirements. Dimensional may vote for proposals requesting disclosure of specific environmental and social data, such as information about board oversight, risk management policies and procedures, or performance against a specific metric, if Dimensional believes that the portfolio company's current disclosure is inadequate to allow shareholders to effectively assess the portfolio company's handling of a material issue.

## EVALUATING DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL ENVIRONMENTAL OR SOCIAL RISKS

Dimensional generally believes that information about the oversight and mitigation of material environmental or social risks should be disclosed by portfolio companies.

Dimensional generally expects the disclosure regarding oversight and mitigation to include:

- A description of material risks.
- A description of the process for identifying and prioritizing such risks and how frequently it occurs.
- The policies and procedures governing the handling of each material risk.
- A description of the management-level roles/groups involved in oversight and mitigation of each material risk.
- A description of the metrics used to assess the effectiveness of mitigating each material risk, and the frequency at which performance against these metrics is assessed.
- A description of how the board is informed of material risks and the progress against relevant metrics.

In certain instances where Dimensional determines that disclosure by a portfolio company is insufficient for a shareholder to be able to adequately assess the relevant risks facing a portfolio company, or where a portfolio company has faced a material controversy in relation to the issue, Dimensional may, on a case-by-case basis, vote against individual directors, committee members, or the entire board, or may vote in favor of related shareholder proposals consistent with Dimensional's general approach to such proposals.

### Political and Lobbying Activities

Dimensional expects boards of portfolio companies to exercise oversight of political and lobbying-related expenditures and ensure that such spending is in line with shareholder interests.

In evaluating a portfolio company's policies related to political and lobbying expenditure, Dimensional expects the following practices:

- The board to adopt policies and procedures to oversee political and lobbying expenditures;
- The details of the board oversight, including the policies and procedures governing such expenditures, to be disclosed publicly; and
- That board oversight of political and lobbying activities, such as spending, should include ensuring that the portfolio company's publicly stated positions are in alignment with its related activities and spending.

### Human Capital Management

Dimensional expects boards of portfolio companies to exercise oversight of human capital management issues. Dimensional expects portfolio companies to disclose sufficient information for shareholders to understand the policies, procedures, and personnel a portfolio company has in place to address issues related to human capital management. This disclosure should include the portfolio company's human capital management goals in key areas, such as compensation, employee health and wellness, employee training and development, and workforce composition, as well as the metrics by which the portfolio company assesses performance against these goals.

### Climate-Related Risks

Dimensional expects boards of portfolio companies to exercise oversight of climate-related risks that may have a material impact on the portfolio company. Climate-related risks may include physical risks from changing weather patterns and/or transitional risks from changes in regulation or consumer preferences. Dimensional expects portfolio companies to disclose information on their handling of these risks to the extent those risks may have a material impact on the portfolio company. Disclosure should include:

- The specific risks identified.
- The potential impact these risks could have on the portfolio company's business, operations, or strategy.
- Whether the risks are overseen by a specific committee or the full board.
- The frequency with which the board or responsible board committee receives updates on the risks and the types of information reviewed.
- The management-level roles/groups responsible for managing these risks.
- The metrics used to assess the handling of these risks, how they are calculated, and the reason for their selection, particularly when the metrics recommended by a recognized third-party framework, such as Task Force for Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB), or Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) Standards, are not being used.
- Targets used by the company to manage climate-related risks and performance against those targets.

### Human Rights

Dimensional expects portfolio company boards to exercise oversight of human rights issues that could pose a material risk to the business, including forced labor, child labor, privacy, freedom of expression, and land and water rights. Dimensional expects portfolio companies to disclose information on their handling of these risks to the extent those risks may have a material impact on the portfolio company. Disclosure should include:

- The specific risks identified.
- The potential impact these risks could have on the portfolio company's business, operations, or strategy.
- Whether the risks are overseen by a specific committee or the full board.
- The frequency with which the board or responsible board committee receives updates on the risks and the types of information reviewed.
- Details on how the portfolio company monitors human rights throughout the organization and supply chain, including the scope and frequency of audits and how instances of noncompliance are resolved.
- The policies governing human rights throughout the organization and supply chain and the extent to which the policy aligns with recognized global frameworks such as the UN's Guiding Principles on Human Rights and the OECD's Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
- Details of violations of the policy and corrective action taken.

### Cybersecurity

Dimensional expects portfolio company boards to exercise oversight of cybersecurity issues that could pose a material risk to the business. Dimensional expects portfolio companies to disclose information on their handling of these risks, to the extent those risks may have a material impact on the portfolio company. Disclosure should include:

- Policies and procedures to manage cybersecurity risk and identify cybersecurity incidents.
- The role of management in implementing cybersecurity policies and procedures.
- The role of the board in overseeing cybersecurity risk and the process by which the board is informed of incidents.
- Material cybersecurity incidents and remedial actions taken.

## Evaluation Framework for US-Listed Companies

### DIRECTOR ELECTIONS

#### Uncontested Director Elections

Shareholders elect the board of a portfolio company to represent their interests and oversee management, and they expect boards to adopt policies and practices that align the interests of the board and management with those of shareholders and limit the potential for conflicts of interest.

One of the most important measures aimed at ensuring that portfolio company shareholders' interests are represented is an independent board of directors, made up of individuals with the diversity of backgrounds, experiences, and skill sets needed to effectively oversee management and manage risk. Dimensional expects portfolio company boards to be majority-independent and key committees to be fully independent.

Dimensional believes shareholders should have a say in who represents their interests and that portfolio companies should be responsive to shareholder concerns. Dimensional may vote against or withhold votes from individual directors, committee members, or the full board, and may also vote against such directors when they serve on other portfolio company boards, in the following situations:

- The continued service of directors who failed to receive the support of a majority of shareholders (regardless of whether the company uses a majority or plurality vote standard).
- Failure to adequately respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals.

#### Contested Director Elections

In the case of contested board elections at portfolio companies, Dimensional takes a case-by-case approach. With the goal of maximizing shareholder value, Dimensional considers the qualifications of the nominees, the likelihood that each side can accomplish their stated plans, the portfolio company's corporate governance practices, the incumbent board's history of responsiveness to shareholders, and the market's reaction to the contest.

### BOARD STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION

#### Age and Term Limits

Dimensional believes it is the responsibility of a portfolio company's nominating committee to ensure that the portfolio company's board of directors is composed of individuals with the skills needed to effectively oversee management and will generally oppose proposals seeking to impose age or term limits for directors.

That said, portfolio companies should clearly disclose their director evaluation and board refreshment policies in their proxy. Lack of healthy turnover on the board of a portfolio company or lack of observable diversity on a portfolio company board may lead Dimensional to scrutinize the rigor of a portfolio company's board refreshment process.

### CEO/Chair

Dimensional believes that portfolio company boards are responsible for determining whether the separation of roles is appropriate and adequately protects the interests of shareholders.

At portfolio companies with a combined CEO/Chair, Dimensional expects the board to appoint a lead independent director with specific responsibilities, including the setting of meeting agendas, to seek to ensure the board is able to act independently.

Recent environmental, social, and governance controversies resulting from inadequate board oversight may be taken into account when voting on shareholder proposals seeking the separation of the roles of CEO and chair at a portfolio company.

## GOVERNANCE PRACTICES

### Classified Boards

Dimensional believes director votes are an important mechanism to increase board accountability to shareholders. Dimensional therefore advocates for boards at portfolio companies to give shareholders the right to vote on the entire slate of directors on an annual basis.

Dimensional will generally support proposals to declassify existing boards at portfolio companies and will generally oppose efforts by portfolio companies to adopt classified board structures, in which only part of the board is elected each year.

Dimensional will generally vote against or withhold votes from incumbent directors at portfolio companies that adopt a classified board without shareholder approval. Dimensional may also vote against or withhold votes from directors at portfolio companies that adopt classified boards prior to or in connection with an IPO, unless accompanied by a reasonable sunset provision.

### Dual Classes of Stock

Dual-class share structures are generally seen as detrimental to shareholder rights, as they are accompanied by unequal voting rights. Dimensional believes in the principle of one share, one vote.

Dimensional opposes the creation of dual-class share structures with unequal voting rights at portfolio companies and will generally vote against proposals to create or continue dual-class capital structures.

Dimensional will generally vote against or withhold votes from directors at portfolio companies that adopt a dual-class structure without shareholder approval after the company's IPO. Dimensional will generally vote against or withhold votes from directors for implementation of a dual-class structure prior to or in connection with an IPO, unless accompanied by a reasonable sunset provision.

### Supermajority Vote Requirements

Dimensional believes that the affirmative vote of a majority of shareholders of a portfolio company should be sufficient to approve items such as bylaw amendments and mergers. Dimensional will generally vote against proposals seeking to implement a supermajority vote requirement and for shareholder proposals seeking the adoption of a majority vote standard.

Dimensional will generally vote against or withhold votes from incumbent directors at portfolio companies that adopt a supermajority vote requirement without shareholder approval. Dimensional may also vote against or withhold votes from directors at portfolio companies that adopt supermajority vote requirements prior to or in connection with an IPO, unless accompanied by a reasonable sunset provision.

### Shareholder Rights Plans (Poison Pills)

Dimensional generally opposes poison pills. As a result, Dimensional may vote against the adoption of a pill and all directors at a portfolio company that put a pill in place without first obtaining shareholder approval. Votes against (or withheld votes from) directors may extend beyond the portfolio company that adopted the pill to all boards the directors serve on.

### Cumulative Voting

Under cumulative voting, each shareholder is entitled to the number of his or her shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. Shareholders have the flexibility to allocate their votes among directors in the proportion they see fit including casting all their votes for one director. This is particularly impactful in the election of dissident candidates to the board in the event of a proxy contest.

Dimensional will typically support proposals that provide for cumulative voting and against proposals to eliminate cumulative voting unless the portfolio company has demonstrated that there are adequate safeguards in place, such as proxy access and majority voting.

### Majority Voting

For the election of directors, portfolio companies may adopt either a majority or plurality vote standard. In a plurality vote standard, the directors with the most votes are elected. If the number of directors up for election is equal to the number of board seats, each director only needs to receive one vote in order to be elected. In a majority vote standard, in order to be elected, a director must receive the support of a majority of shares voted or present at the meeting.

Dimensional supports a majority (rather than plurality) voting standard for uncontested director elections at portfolio companies. The majority vote standard should be accompanied by a director resignation policy to address failed elections.

To account for contested director elections, portfolio companies with a majority vote standard should include a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats.

### Right to Call Meetings and Act by Written Consent

Dimensional will generally support the right of shareholders to call special meetings of a portfolio company board (if they own 25% of shares outstanding) and take action by written consent.

### Proxy Access

Dimensional will typically support management and shareholder proposals for proxy access that allow a shareholder (or group of shareholders) holding 3% of voting power for three years to nominate up to 25% of a portfolio company board. Dimensional will typically vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.

### Amend Bylaws/Charters

Dimensional believes that shareholders should have the right to amend a portfolio company's bylaws. Dimensional will generally vote against or withhold votes from incumbent directors at portfolio companies that place substantial restrictions on shareholders' ability to amend bylaws through excessive ownership requirements for submitting proposals or restrictions on the types of issues that can be amended.

### Exclusive Forum

Dimensional is generally supportive of management proposals at portfolio companies to adopt an exclusive forum for shareholder litigation.

### Indemnification and Exculpation of Directors and Officers

Dimensional intends to evaluate proposals seeking to enact or expand indemnification or exculpation provisions on a case-by-case basis, considering board rationale and specific provisions being proposed.

### Advance Notice Provisions

Portfolio company bylaw amendments known as "advance notice provisions" set out the steps shareholders must follow when submitting an item for inclusion on the agenda of a shareholder meeting. These provisions may serve as an entrenchment device that can result in reduced accountability at the board level in cases where they impose onerous requirements on shareholders wishing to submit a nominee for the board of directors. When evaluating advanced notice provisions, whether for the submission of a shareholder candidate or the submission of other permissible proposals, Dimensional generally does not support provisions that:

- Require shareholder-nominated candidates to disclose information that is not required for new board-nominated candidates.
- Impose unduly burdensome disclosure requirements on shareholder proponents.
- Significantly limit the time period shareholders have to submit proposals or nominees.

Dimensional may vote against or withhold votes from directors who adopt such provisions without shareholder approval.

## EXECUTIVE AND DIRECTOR COMPENSATION

### Equity-Based Compensation

Dimensional supports the adoption of equity plans that align the interests of the portfolio company board, management, and portfolio company employees with those of shareholders.

Dimensional will evaluate equity plans on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the potential dilution to shareholders, the portfolio company's historical use of equity, and the particular plan features.

Dimensional will typically vote against plans that have features that have a negative impact on shareholders of portfolio companies. Such features include single-trigger or discretionary vesting, an overly broad definition of change in control, a lack of minimum vesting periods for grants, evergreen provisions, and the ability to reprice shares without shareholder approval.

Dimensional may also vote against equity plans if problematic equity grant practices have contributed to a pay for performance misalignment at the portfolio company.

### Employee Stock Purchase Plans

Dimensional will generally support qualified employee stock purchase plans (as defined by Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code), provided that the purchase price is no less than 85% of market value, the number of shares reserved for the plan is no more than 10% of outstanding shares, and the offering period is no more than 27 months.

### Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay)

Dimensional supports reasonable compensation for executives that is clearly linked to the portfolio company's performance. Compensation should serve as a means to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders. To the extent that compensation is excessive, it represents a transfer to management of shareholder wealth. Therefore, Dimensional reviews proposals seeking approval of a portfolio company's executive compensation plan closely, taking into account the quantum of pay, portfolio company performance, and the structure of the plan.

Certain practices, such as:

- multiyear guaranteed bonuses
- excessive severance agreements (particularly those that vest without involuntary job loss or diminution of duties or those with excise-tax gross-ups)
- single, or the same, metrics used for both short-term and long-term executive compensation plans

may encourage excessive risk-taking by executives at portfolio companies and are generally opposed by Dimensional.

At portfolio companies that have a history of problematic pay practices or excessive compensation, Dimensional will consider the portfolio company's responsiveness to shareholders' concerns and may vote against or withhold votes from members of the compensation committee if these concerns have not been addressed.

### Frequency of Say on Pay

Executive compensation in the United States is typically composed of three parts: 1) base salary, 2) cash bonuses based on annual performance (short-term incentive awards), and 3) equity awards based on performance over a multiyear period (long-term incentive awards).



Dimensional supports triennial say on pay because it allows for a longer-term assessment of whether compensation was adequately linked to portfolio company performance. This is particularly important in situations where a company makes significant changes to its long-term incentive awards, as the effectiveness of such changes in aligning pay and performance cannot be determined in a single year.

If there are serious concerns about a portfolio company's compensation plan in a year where the plan is not on the ballot, Dimensional may vote against or withhold votes from members of the Compensation Committee.

#### **Executive Severance Agreements (Golden Parachutes)**

Dimensional analyzes golden parachute proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Dimensional expects payments to be reasonable on both an absolute basis and relative to the value of the transaction. Dimensional will typically vote against agreements with cash severance of more than three times the salary and bonus.

Dimensional expects vesting of equity to be contingent on both a change in control and a subsequent involuntary termination of the employee ("double-trigger change in control").

### **CORPORATE ACTIONS**

#### **Reincorporation**

Dimensional will evaluate reincorporation proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Dimensional may vote against reincorporations if the move would result in a substantial diminution of shareholder rights at the portfolio company.

### **CAPITALIZATION**

#### **Increase Authorized Shares**

Dimensional will vote case by case on proposals seeking to increase common or preferred stock of a portfolio company, taking into account the purpose for which the shares will be used and the risk to shareholders of not approving the request.

Dimensional will typically vote against requests for common or preferred stock issuances that are excessively dilutive relative to common market practice.

Dimensional will typically vote against proposals at portfolio companies with multiple share classes to increase the number of shares of the class with superior voting rights.

#### **Blank Check Preferred Stock**

Blank check preferred stock is stock that can be issued at the discretion of the board, with the voting, conversion, distribution, and other rights determined by the board at the time of issue. Therefore, blank check preferred stock can potentially serve as a means to entrench management and prevent takeovers at portfolio companies.

To mitigate concerns regarding what Dimensional believes is the inappropriate use of blank check preferred stock, Dimensional expects portfolio companies seeking approval for blank preferred stock to clearly state that the shares will not be used for antitakeover purposes.

### Share Repurchases

Dimensional will generally support open-market share repurchase plans that allow all shareholders to participate on equal terms. Portfolio companies that use metrics such as earnings per share (EPS) in their executive compensation plans should ensure that the impact of such repurchases is taken into account when determining payouts.

## SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

Dimensional's goal when voting on portfolio company shareholder proposals is to support those proposals that protect or enhance shareholder value through improved board accountability, improved policies and procedures, or improved disclosure.

When evaluating environmental or social shareholder proposals, Dimensional will use research to consider whether the proposal addresses a material issue to the portfolio company, the portfolio company's current handling of the issue (both on an absolute basis and relative to market practices), the portfolio company's compliance with regulatory requirements, and the potential cost to the portfolio company of implementing the proposal.

On behalf of Social-Voting Funds or Accounts, Dimensional will typically support, subject to the foregoing consideration, proposals for greater board accountability, improved policies and procedures, or increased disclosure on the following matters:

- Climate-related risks and greenhouse gas emissions
- Environmental impact
- Climate-related lobbying activities
- Financing of fossil fuel activities
- Workforce gender diversity
- Human rights risk
- Factory farming
- Sale and distribution of tobacco products

In addition, and subject to the foregoing, Dimensional will typically not support on behalf of Social-Voting Funds or Accounts proposals favoring access to abortion.

In instances where a shareholder proposal is excluded from the meeting agenda but the SEC has declined to state a view on whether such proposal can be excluded, Dimensional expects the portfolio company to provide shareholders with substantive disclosure concerning this exclusion. If substantive disclosure is lacking, Dimensional may vote against or withhold votes from certain directors on a case-by-case basis.

## Evaluation Framework for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA)-Listed Companies

### CONTINENTAL EUROPE

#### Director Election Guidelines

- Portfolio company boards should be majority-independent (excluding shareholder or employee representatives as provided by law); however, lower levels of board independence may be acceptable in controlled companies and in those markets where local best practice indicate that at least one-third of the board be independent.
- A majority of audit and remuneration committee members (excluding shareholder or employee representatives as provided by law) should be independent; the committees overall should be at least one-third independent.
- Executives should generally not serve on audit and remuneration committees.
- The CEO and board chair roles should generally be separate.
- Portfolio companies should comply with relevant listing rules, corporate governance codes, and market best practices with regards to board composition.

#### Remuneration Guidelines

Dimensional expects annual remuneration reports published by portfolio companies pursuant to the Shareholder Rights Directive II to disclose, at a minimum:

- The amount paid to executives;
- Alignment between pay and performance;
- The targets used for variable incentive plans and the ex-post levels achieved; and
- The rationale for any discretion applied.

#### Other Market-Specific Guidelines for Continental Europe

In Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, Dimensional will generally vote against the appointment of a former CEO as chair of the board of directors or supervisory board of a portfolio company.

## **UNITED KINGDOM**

Dimensional expects portfolio companies to follow the applicable requirements of the FCA Listing Rules, the UK Corporate Governance Code, and market best practice with regards to board and committee composition. When evaluating portfolio company boards, Dimensional will also consider the recommendations of the FTSE Women Leaders and Parker Reviews with regards to board composition.

Dimensional expects companies to align their remuneration with the requirements of the UK Corporate Governance Code and to consider best practices such as those set forth in the Investment Association Principles of Remuneration.

## **IRELAND**

Dimensional will consider the recommendations of the Balance for the Better Business Review Group with regards to evaluating board composition.

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

Dimensional expects portfolio companies to follow the recommendations of the King Report on Corporate Governance (King Code IV) with regards to board and committee composition.

## Evaluation Framework for Australia and New Zealand-Listed Companies

### Uncontested Director Elections

Shareholders elect the board of a portfolio company to represent their interests and oversee management and expect portfolio company boards to adopt policies and practices that align the interests of the board and management with those of shareholders and limit the potential for conflicts of interest.

One of the most important measures aimed at ensuring that portfolio company shareholders' interests are represented is an independent board of directors, made up of individuals with the diversity of backgrounds, experiences, and skill sets needed to effectively oversee management and manage risk. Dimensional expects portfolio company boards to be majority independent.

Dimensional believes that key audit and remuneration committees should be composed of independent directors. Dimensional will generally vote against executive directors of the portfolio company who serve on the audit committee or who serve on the remuneration committee if the remuneration committee is not majority independent.

Dimensional will consider the ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles and Recommendations and the NZX Corporate Governance Code, respectively.

### CEO/Chair

Dimensional expects Australian and New Zealand portfolio companies to separate the CEO and board chair roles, with the board chair being an independent director, in line with the expectation set forth in the ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles and Recommendations and the NZX Corporate Governance Code, respectively.

### Auditors

Neither Australian nor New Zealand law requires the annual ratification of auditors; therefore, concerns with a portfolio company's audit practices will be reflected in votes against members of the audit committee in both markets.

Dimensional may vote against audit committee members at a portfolio company if there are concerns with the auditor's independence, the accuracy of the auditor's report, the level of non-audit fees, or if lack of disclosure makes it difficult to assess these factors.

Dimensional may also vote against audit committee members in instances of fraud or material failures in oversight of audit functions.

### Share Issuances

Dimensional will evaluate requests for share issuances on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such as the impact on current shareholders and the rationale for the request.

When voting on approval of prior share distributions, at Australian and New Zealand portfolio companies, Dimensional will generally support prior issuances that conform to the dilution guidelines set out in ASX Listing Rule 7.1 and NZX Listing Rule 4, respectively.

### Share Repurchase

Dimensional will evaluate requests for share repurchases on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such as the impact on current shareholders, the rationale for the request, and the portfolio company's history of repurchases. Dimensional expects repurchases to be made in arms-length transactions using independent third parties.

Dimensional may vote against portfolio company plans that do not include limitations on the portfolio company's ability to use the plan to repurchase shares from third parties at a premium and limitations on the use of share purchases as an antitakeover device.

### Constitution Amendments

Dimensional will evaluate requests for amendments to a portfolio company's constitution on a case-by-case basis. The primary consideration will be the impact on the rights of shareholders.

### Non-Executive Director Remuneration

Dimensional will support non-executive director remuneration at portfolio companies that is reasonable in both size and composition relative to industry and market norms.

Dimensional will generally vote against components of non-executive director remuneration that are likely to impair a director's independence, such as options or performance-based remuneration.

### Equity Based Remuneration

Dimensional supports the adoption of equity plans that align the interests of the portfolio company board, management, and portfolio company employees with those of shareholders.

Companies should clearly disclose components of the plan, including vesting periods and performance hurdles.

Dimensional may vote against plans that are exceedingly dilutive to existing shareholders. Plans that permit retesting or repricing will generally be viewed unfavorably.

Dimensional may vote against the granting of equity-based awards, such as performance rights, stock options, and stock appreciation rights, to specific executives, including CEOs and Managing Directors, if also voting against the portfolio company's remuneration report under the analysis forth in the Executive Remuneration section of the Global Framework.

## Evaluation Framework for Japan-Listed Securities

### Uncontested Director Elections

Shareholders elect the board of a portfolio company to represent their interests and oversee management and expect portfolio company boards to adopt policies and practices that align the interests of the board and management with those of shareholders and limit the potential for conflicts of interest.

One of the most important measures aimed at ensuring that portfolio company shareholders' interests are represented is an independent board of directors, made up of individuals with the diversity of backgrounds, experiences, and skill sets needed to effectively oversee management and manage risk. With respect to board composition, Dimensional may consider local market practice, including requirements under the Japan Corporate Governance Code, and may vote against directors if the board does not meet established market norms.

At portfolio companies with a three-committee structure, Dimensional expects at least one-third of the board to be outsiders. Ideally, the board should be majority independent. At portfolio companies with a three-committee structure that have a controlling shareholder, at least two directors and at least one-third of the board should be independent outsiders.

At portfolio companies with an audit committee structure, Dimensional expects at least one-third of the board to be outsiders. Ideally, the audit committee should be entirely independent; at a minimum, any outside directors who serve on the committee should be independent. At portfolio companies with an audit committee structure that have a controlling shareholder, at least two directors and at least one-third of the board should be independent outsiders.

At portfolio companies with a statutory auditor structure, Dimensional expects at least two directors and at least one-third of the board to be outsiders. At portfolio companies with a statutory auditor structure that have a controlling shareholder, at least two directors and at least one-third of the board should be independent outsiders.

### Statutory Auditors

Statutory auditors are responsible for effectively overseeing management and ensuring that decisions made are in the best interest of shareholders. Dimensional may vote against statutory auditors who are remiss in their responsibilities.

When voting on outside statutory auditors, Dimensional expects nominees to be independent and to have the capacity to fulfill the requirements of their role as evidenced by attendance at meetings of the board of directors or board of statutory auditors.

### Director and Statutory Auditor Compensation

Dimensional will support compensation for portfolio company directors and statutory auditors that is reasonable in both size and composition relative to industry and market norms.

When requesting an increase to the level of director fees, Dimensional expects portfolio companies to provide a specific reason for the increase. Dimensional will generally support an increase of director fees if it is in conjunction with the introduction of performance-based compensation, or where the ceiling for performance-based compensation is being increased. Dimensional will generally not support an increase in director fees if

there is evidence that the directors have been remiss in effectively overseeing management or ensuring that decisions made are in the best interest of shareholders.

Dimensional will typically support an increase to the statutory-auditor compensation ceiling unless there is evidence that the statutory auditors have been remiss in effectively overseeing management or ensuring that decisions made are in the best interest of shareholders.

Dimensional will generally support the granting of annual bonuses to portfolio company directors and statutory auditors unless there is evidence the board or the statutory auditors have been remiss in effectively overseeing management or ensuring that decisions made are in the best interest of shareholders.

Dimensional generally supports the granting of retirement benefits to portfolio company insiders as long as the individual payments, and aggregate amount of such payments, is disclosed.

Dimensional will generally vote against the granting of retirement bonuses if there is evidence the portfolio company board or statutory auditors have been remiss in effectively overseeing management or ensuring that decisions made are in the best interest of shareholders.

#### Equity Based Compensation

Dimensional supports the adoption of equity plans that align the interests of the portfolio company board, management, and portfolio company employees with those of shareholders.

Dimensional will typically support stock-option plans to portfolio company executives and employees if total dilution from the proposed plans and previous plans does not exceed 5% for mature companies or 10% for growth companies.

Dimensional will generally vote against stock plans if the upper limit of options that can be issued per year is not disclosed.

For deep-discounted stock option plans, Dimensional typically expects portfolio companies to disclose specific performance hurdles.

#### Capital Allocation

Dimensional will typically support well-justified dividend payouts that do not negatively impact the portfolio company's overall financial health.

#### Share Repurchase

Dimensional is typically supportive of portfolio company boards having discretion over share repurchases absent concerns with the company's balance sheet management, capital efficiency, buyback and dividend payout history, board composition, or shareholding structure.

Dimensional will typically support proposed repurchases that do not have a negative impact on shareholder value.

For repurchases of more than 10% of issue share capital, Dimensional expects the company to provide a robust explanation for the request.



### Cross-Shareholding

Dimensional generally believes that portfolio companies should not allocate significant portions of their net assets to investments in companies for noninvestment purposes. For example, in order to strengthen relationships with customers, suppliers, or borrowers. Such cross-shareholding, whether unilateral or reciprocal, can compromise director independence, entrench management, and reduce director accountability to uninterested shareholders. Dimensional may vote against certain directors at companies with excessive cross-shareholdings.

### Shareholder Rights Plans (Poison Pills)

Dimensional believes the market for corporate control, which can result in acquisitions that are accretive to shareholders, should be able to function without undue restrictions. Takeover defenses, such as poison pills, can lead to entrenchment and reduced accountability at the board level.

### Indemnification and Limitations on Liability

Dimensional generally supports limitations on liability for directors and statutory auditors in ordinary circumstances.

### Limit Legal Liability of External Auditors

Dimensional generally opposes limitations on the liability of external auditors.

### Increase in Authorized Capital

Dimensional will typically support requests for increases of less than 100% of currently authorized capital as long as the increase does not leave the portfolio company with less than 30% of the proposed authorized capital outstanding.

For increases that exceed these guidelines, Dimensional expects portfolio companies to provide a robust explanation for the increase.

Dimensional will generally not support requests for increases that will be used as an antitakeover device.

### Expansion of Business Activities

For well performing portfolio companies seeking to expand their business into enterprises related to their core business, Dimensional will typically support management requests to amend the portfolio company's articles to expand the portfolio company's business activities.

## Evaluation Framework for Securities in Other Select Asian Markets

### Uncontested Director Elections

Dimensional expects portfolio companies to disclose biographical information about director candidates sufficient for shareholders to assess the candidate's independence and suitability for board service.

Dimensional expects that portfolio companies will at a minimum meet mandated regulatory or listing standards levels for board independence but should work towards meeting the applicable requirements of the relevant Corporate Governance code.

Dimensional maintains the following expectations for board independence at portfolio companies. The calculation of the level of independence will generally exclude shareholder or employee representatives as provided by law.

- All boards of directors of Malaysian portfolio companies should be at least 33% independent. Boards of directors of Malaysian "Large Companies" as defined by the Securities Commission Malaysia should be majority independent.
- Boards of directors of Indian and Singaporean portfolio companies should be at least 50% independent if the board chair is not independent. If the board chair is independent, the board of directors should be at least 33% independent.
- Boards of directors of Thai, Filipino, Hong Kong and mainland Chinese portfolio companies should be at least 33% independent.
- Boards of directors of Taiwanese portfolio companies should have no fewer than two independent directors and no less than 20% independence.
- Boards of Commissioners of Indonesian portfolio companies should be at least 30% independent, except for banks, insurance companies, and financial institutions, which should be 50% independent.
- Boards of directors of South Korean portfolio companies should be at least 25% independent. The board of directors of Large Companies, as defined by the Commercial Act of South Korea, should be majority independent.

### Director Remuneration

In most Asian markets, director remuneration generally consists of both fees and bonuses.

Dimensional will generally support the payment of fees for serving as a director, fees for attending meetings, and other market-permitted remuneration if the size of such fees and other director remuneration is reasonable relative to industry and market norms.

In the absence of specific proposals to approve director remuneration (including fees and bonuses), Dimensional may vote against the directors who receive such remuneration if concerns are identified.

### Equity-Based Remuneration

In most Asian markets, equity plans are developed and presented for shareholder approval as part of employee remuneration. Equity plans may consist of stock options, restricted shares, or performance shares.

When voting on stock-option plans, restricted share plans, and performance share plans, Dimensional will consider the extent to which the plan is performance-based, the length of performance and vesting periods, and the treatment of equity upon a change in control.

For stock-option plans, if the plan provides for a discount to the market price, Dimensional will consider the reasonableness and rationale for such a discount in light of local market standards.

In instances where Dimensional has identified concerns with a portfolio company's equity plan or equity granting practices, Dimensional will generally oppose the extension of the plan to subsidiary or associate companies.

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